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Abstract 
 
 
Professor Vanberg received the title of Professor Honoris Causa of the University of 
Bucharest for his contribution to the development of the German school of economics. On this 
occasion, he made a brief presentation of the origins and development of the German 
Ordoliberalism and its impact. He further developed on how the Freibourg School reflected upon 
the legal instruments needed for the creation of an economic constitution. 
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In the on-going debate on how to cope with the current financial and 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe the German position with its insistence on 
binding rules is met by many of our partners – in particular in southern Europe 
– with suspicion and resentment. As the American-German historian Volker 
Berghahn has observed in a most recent paper: “In this debate on the best 
solution to the EU crisis, many Keynesian economists, European leaders, and 
the international press have vociferously criticized… Germany’s rule-based 
legal approach to ensure fiscal discipline…, its defence of the independence of 
the Central European Bank … (and) its strict adherence to price stability”1.  
Even though the controversy on – what Berghahn describes as the 
German “rule-based conception of political economy” – provides the motivation 
for what I want to talk about today, my purpose is not to comment on the 
particular arguments that dominate the current debate. Instead, I want to take a 
closer look at the concept of Ordnungspolitik, a concept that has become the 
established label describing the German position. “Ordnungspolitik” denotes an 
                                                          
∗
  Viktor J. Vanberg (14 May 2013). Ordnungspolitik, The Freiburg School and the reason 
of rules. Speech presented at the Award Ceremony for the Conferal of the Honnorary Title of 
Professor Honoris Causa by the University of Bucharest.  
1
  Volker Berghahn, Brigitte Young, “Reflections on Werner Bonefeld’s ‘Freedom and the 
Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism” and the Continuing Importance of the Ideas of 
Ordoliberalism to Understand Germany’s (Contested) Role in Resolving the Euro Zone Crisis”, in 
New Political Economy, 2013, p. 11 (forthcoming, cited from typescript).  
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outlook at politics that, as Berghahn comments, is “shared by most of the 
German political parties… (and) is also endorsed by most of the economic 
profession, domestic media, and the large public”2. It appears, however, to be a 
concept that is difficult to appreciate for observers outside of Germany.  
It is significant that the difficulty of explaining the concept of 
Ordnungspolitik in English – or, for that matter, in French, Italian, Spanish or 
any other language – begins with the fact that there exists no equivalent term 
into which it could be readily translated. In essence, as already suggested, it 
means that political efforts to “steer” the economy should primarily concentrate 
on providing and enforcing a suitable institutional-legal framework for a 
desirable socio-economic “Ordnung,” a term that, like the English term “order” 
derives from Latin word “ordo.” 
What I hope to achieve with my talk is to convey a better understanding of 
the rule-oriented or “Ordnungspolitik”-approach that has informed and continues 
to inform – even if its precepts are not always faithfully honoured – German 
economic policy. I shall develop my argument in two parts, a history of ideas 
part and a systematic part. First, I will talk about the origins of the concept of 
Ordnungspolitik and about the research tradition that is associated with my 
home university, the University of Freiburg. In the second part of my talk I will 
discuss, under the heading “The Reason of Rules,” the systematic rationale that 
lends support to the rule-based concept of politics that Germany insists on in 
Europe’s search for a solution to the current crisis. 
The research tradition within which the concept of Ordnungspolitik has 
been systematically developed and elaborated is called the Freiburg School or 
the Ordo-liberal School. The school was founded in the early 1930s by 
economists and jurists, in particular the economist Walter Eucken (1891-1950) 
and the jurist Franz Böhm (1895-1977), for whom Freiburg University's Faculty 
of Law and Economics ("Fakultät für Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften") 
provided a most conducive framework within which the combination of legal 
and economic perspectives could flourish that is characteristic of the Freiburg 
School tradition. As Böhm later said in retrospect, the founders of the school 
were united in their common concern for the question of the constitutional 
foundations of a free economy and society. 
The ordo-liberalism of the Freiburg School starts from the premise that 
the market order is a constitutional order, that it is defined by its institutional 
framework and, as such, subject to (explicit or implicit) constitutional choice. It 
assumes that the working properties of market processes depend on the nature 
of the legal-institutional frameworks within which they take place, and that the 
issue of which rules are and which are not desirable elements of such 
frameworks ought to be judged as a constitutional issue, i.e. in terms of the 
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ORDNUNGSPOLITIK, THE FREIBURG SCHOOL AND THE REASON OF RULES 
 
25 
relative desirability of relevant constitutional alternatives. After the Second 
World War the teaching of the Freiburg School came to play a critical role as it 
became a major part of the theoretical foundations on which the creation of the 
Social Market Economy in post-war Germany was based. Ludwig Erhardt who, 
as West Germany’s first economic minister and later chancellor, orchastrated 
the post-war economic and monetary reforms was very much influenced by the 
Freiburg tradition and relied on its advocates as advisors. 
Eucken developed his approach in explicit contrast to the research 
program that Gustav Schmoller, the head of the German Historical School had 
propagated and that exerted its continuing influence on economic thought and 
economic policy in Germany. With his 1932 article “Structural changes of the 
state and the crisis of capitalism” (“Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die 
Krise des Kapitalismus”) and with his two major works, the Foundations of 
Economics (Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, 1989 [1939]) and the Principles of 
Economic Policy (Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, 1990 [1952]), he wanted 
to provide an alternative to the Historical School's theoretical approach to economic 
analysis as well as to its unprincipled discretionary approach to economic policy. 
His aim was to develop a systematically integrated approach to the theoretical 
study and the political shaping of a constitutional social-economic-political order, 
or – to use the German terminology – a systematic approach to Ordnungstheorie 
and Ordnungspolitik.  
As the term Ordnung (order) is the central concept in the research 
program of the Freiburg school, it is important to note that, in the context of that 
program, it is systematically related to the concept of the economic constitution, 
in the sense of the rules of the game, upon which economies or economic 
systems are based. As Eucken insists, since all economic activities inevitably 
take place within some historically evolved framework of rules and institutions, 
the research-guiding question must be: "What are the rules of the game?" 
Economic orders, this is the main message, must be understood in terms of the 
underlying economic constitutions, which not only includes the formal legal-
institutional framework but also informal conventions and traditions that govern 
economic activities in the respective communities. 
The founders of the Freiburg school emphasised that the principal means 
by which economic policy can seek to improve ‘the economy’ is by improving 
the institutional framework within which economic activities take place or, as 
they called it, the economic constitution. What motivated their work was an 
interest in applying theoretical insights from law and economics to the practical 
problem “of understanding and fashioning the legal instruments for an 
economic constitution”, a concern that they saw as part of the broader project of 
inquiring into the constitutional foundations of a functionable and humane 
socio-economic-political order.  
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Eucken and Böhm emphasised that their interest was not in developing a 
research program as a purely academic enterprise, but in seeking for answers to 
the practical question of how a desirable economic order may be created and 
maintained, a question that they approached as a problem of constitutional 
choice, i.e. as a question of how a desirable economic order can be generated by 
creating an appropriate economic constitution. The joint efforts of law and 
economics were to them an indispensable prerequisite for what they called 
“constitutional economic policy” (“Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik”), a policy 
that seeks to improve the resulting economic order in an indirect manner, by 
reforming the rules of the game, by contrast to an economic policy that seeks to 
improve outcomes directly by way of specific interventions into the economic 
process. The general aim that, in their view, such constitutional economic policy 
had to pursue was to create conditions under which economic actors in seeking 
to further their own interest also promote the common interest. In other terms, 
they considered it the task of Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik to create conditions 
under which the “invisible hand” that Adam Smith had described can be 
expected to do its work.  
In the sense noted, the research program of the Freiburg school can be 
said to comprise a theoretical paradigm as well as a policy paradigm. The 
theoretical paradigm is based on the premise that an adequate analysis and 
explanation of economic phenomena ought to account for the nature of the 
constitutional framework, or the rules of the game, under which they occur. The 
policy paradigm is based on the premise that economic policy should seek to 
improve the framework of rules, the economic constitution, such that a well-
functioning and desirable economic order results, rather than seeking to bring 
about desired outcomes directly by specific interventions into the economic process. 
Ordnungstheorie is the name for the explanatory part of the Freiburg research 
program, the paradigm of systematically studying the working properties of alternative 
institutional-constitutional arrangements, and the complex interdependencies between 
various components (company law, patent law, tax laws, labor law etc.) of a nation's 
economic constitution. Ordnungspolitik is the name for its policy paradigm, for 
an integrated approach to the various components of the legal-institutional 
framework in which a market economy is embedded. 
While the founders of the Freiburg School placed themselves firmly in the 
tradition of classical liberalism, they emphasised, in contrast to some varieties 
of liberalism, that a free-market order is not simply what one would find if and 
where government is absent, that it is not a natural event but a political-cultural 
product, based on a constitutional order that requires careful 'cultivation' for its 
maintenance and proper functioning. In this regard they found it necessary to 
distance themselves from a laissez-faire liberalism that failed to appreciate the 
essential positive role that government has to play in creating and maintaining 
an appropriate framework of rules and institutions that allows market 
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competition to work effectively. The Freiburg ordoliberals made it clear that the 
desirable working properties that the classical liberals attributed to market 
competition can not be expected from any unqualified competitive process per 
se, but requires the creation and maintainance of an appropriate framework of 
“rules of the game of Leistungswettbewerb”, a competition in which 
performance is measured in terms of better service to consumers. And to create 
conditions conducive to such Leistungswettbewerb is, in their view, a genuine 
and indispensible political task, a task for Ordnungspolitik. This task they 
likened to the activities of a gardener who does not construct things, like an 
engineer, but provides for conditions that are conducive to the natural growth of 
what is considered desirable, while holding back the growth of what is not 
desired. As Franz Böhm put it, to maintain a well-functioning market economy 
requires a continuous nursing and gardening, comparable to creating and 
maintaining a highly cultivated park. 
While the founders of the Freiburg School mostly focused on the threat 
that “private economic power” poses to a properly working competitive market 
order, they ignored by no means the fact that the deeper roots of anti-competitive 
contrivances must be sought much more in the political than in the private arena 
per se. In fact, most central to the research program that they initiated, and very 
much in line with modern political economy, is what the Freiburg ordoliberals 
had to say about a problem that they described as “refeudalisation”, and that in 
contemporary economics is discussed as the problem of rentseeking. The 
ordoliberals saw the essential feature of the competitive market order in the fact 
that it is a privilege-free, non-discriminating constitutional order within which 
economic actors meet as legal equals, and they regarded as the essential liberal 
principle that “the state should on no account be allowed to confer privileges”.3 
Accordingly, they regarded the granting of special privileges, in whatever form, 
as a violation of the very principles on which a competitive market order is 
built, as a violation of the fundamental constitutional commitment that is 
implied in opting for the market order and the privilege-free civil law society. In 
no lesser clarity than modern public-choice contributions on the problem of 
rentseeking, the Freiburg ordoliberals described the fatal political dynamics that 
inevitably unfolds where governments and legislators are empowered to grant 
privileges and where, in consequence, interest groups seek to obtain such 
privileges. Such a government is, as Böhm phrased it, “constantly faced with a 
considerable temptation to meet the contradictory demands of many pressure 
groups. ... The fact that this tendency is, as it were, in the nature of things makes 
it a weakness of the system which must be taken seriously”.4 While, so Böhm 
argued, it is in citizens’ common interest that legislator and government create 
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4
  Böhm 1989, p. 66; 1980, p. 166. 
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and maintain a framework of rules which provides for a well functioning market 
order, their separate interests may well work in the opposite direction. As he 
puts it, “it is possible for any participant and for any group of participants to 
obtain benefits by violating the rules,.... at the expense of other participants or 
groups of participants”,5 be it by explicit rule violations such as the forming of 
cartels, be it by lobbying for special privileges. The latter strategy is, as Böhm 
pointed out, particularly attractive because “in this case, the individual does not 
expose himself to the odium of cheating but demands are made of the legislator 
or the government to elevate cheating to a... governmental programme... 
Protective duties, tax privileges, direct subsidies, price supports, initial support 
for establishing monopoly or 'orderly markets' can be demanded. ... It is the 
state itself which is to be enjoined to override the rules of the prevailing order in 
favor of one group and at the expense of other groups or citizens6.” 
The insight into the conflict between citizens’ common interests in a 
functioning market order and their counterveiling special interests provides the 
logic behind the ordoliberals' diagnosis that the competitive market order is not 
self-generating and self-maintaining but needs the assistence of Ordnungspolitik. 
In assigning to the state the task of acting as “guardian of the competitive 
order”, as “Hüter der Wettbewerbsordnung”, the Freiburg ordoliberals found 
themselves facing a fundamental dilemma. The logic of their argument implied 
that the solution to the problem of guarding the competitive order had to come 
from an agency, the government, that they recognised, at the same time, to be a 
major source of the defects that it was supposed to cure. They did by no means 
naively expect an unqualified ‘state’ to act in the common interest but, instead, 
explicitly criticised as illusionary the belief that government per se can be 
trusted to act as a benign and omniscient agent of the common good. They 
insisted that – just as the economic order needs ‘cultivation’ – the political order 
as it exists must not be taken as an unalterable fate, but should be regarded as 
something that can be and must be reformed. And they were fully aware of the 
fact that the real challenge is, in the political realm no less then in the economy, 
to establish a framework that induces ordinary, self-interested people to do, in 
pursuit of their own interest, what is in the common interest of all. In other 
words, they recognised that the solution to the problem of rentseeking must 
ultimately be found in the political constitution. They saw that, in order for the 
state to act as reliable guardian of the competitive economic constitution, the 
constitutional order of ‘the state,’ or the rules of the game of politics, must be 
reformed in a manner that serves this purpose.  
A phrase that the founders of the Freiburg tradition used, and that has often 
been misunderstood, is that a ‘strong state’ is needed to fend off interest-group 
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pressures. This was definitely not meant as an argument in favour of an 
authoritarion state with large discretionary power. To the contrary, the Freiburg 
ordoliberals expressly noted that it is the modern growth of the state's apparatus 
and activities, that have made it “a plaything in the hands of interest groups”.7 
The formula ‘strong state’ was meant by them as a shorthand for a state that is 
constrained by a political constitution that prevents government from becoming 
the target of special-interest rentseeking. Admittedly, they did not discuss in 
detail what such a constitution was to entail and how constitutional safeguards 
might be installed that effectively prevent the dynamics of privilege seeking and 
privilege granting. But they emphasized as the essential goal that the authority 
and the power to discriminate among citizens by granting privileges to some 
groups at the expense of others must be taken away from governments and legislators. 
Eucken, in particular, emphasised the importance of extending the logic 
of Ordnungspolitik from the realm of the economic constitution to that of the 
political constitution. He explicitly stated that, just as Ordnungspolitik is needed 
in order to establish and to maintain an appropriate economic constitution, 
Ordnungspolitik is also needed at the level of politics in order to establish and to 
maintain an appropriate political constitution. His early death – he died in 1950 
while delivering a series of lecture at the London School of Economics to which 
he had been invited by Hayek – prevented Eucken from working out his 
thoughts on the notion of Ordnungspolitik for the political realm. But the 
paradigm that he and Böhm have launched clearly invites such an extension of 
its logic from the market arena to the political arena. It is not least in this regard 
that the modern research program of constitutional political economy which has 
been launched by James Buchanan can be considered a natural supplement to 
the Freiburg tradition. 
The significant contribution that both these research programs, the ordo-
liberalism of the Freiburg School and Buchanan’s constitutional economics, 
have made to the classical liberal tradition is that they have sharpened our 
awareness of the constitutional dimension of the liberal paradigm, an awareness 
of the critical role of the rules of the game, both in the market arena and in 
politics. Time constraints prevent me from commenting more extensively on the 
affinity between the Freiburg tradition and Buchanan’s research program. 
Buchanan’s contribution will be of direct relevance, though, for the second part 
of my talk, to which I shall turn now, and in which I will look at the general 
philosophy, or the systematic arguments, that lend support to the rule-based 
Ordnungspolitik approach. While within the Freiburg tradition the philosophical 
grounding of the rule-oriented outlook remained largely implicit, it is notably in 
Buchanan’s work and in that of Friedrich Hayek that the relevant arguments 
have been explicitly discussed. It is these arguments that I look at in the 
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remainder of my talk. In fact, the heading “The Reason of Rules” that, as 
mentioned at the beginning, I have chosen for the second part is, as some of you 
may have noticed, exactly the title of a book that Buchanan wrote jointly with 
Geoffrey Brennan8.  
Before looking more closely on the different reasons of rules that I want 
to comment on it is useful briefly to describe the general issue that is at stake in 
the current debate on the European crisis. At the heart of the controversy is the 
issue of the domains in which – and the extent to which – politics should be 
constrained by rules as opposed to be given discretionary authority to do what is 
deemed to be expedient under the given circumstances. 
Discretionary authority means that government can adopt among its 
available options the one that, in the particular situation it faces, it considers 
“best” in light of its expected consequences, all things considered. By contrast, 
rule-governed politics means that government is bound either by prescriptive or 
positive rules, rules that require it in certain types of problem situations to adopt 
certain types of actions, or by proscriptive or negative rules, rules that require it 
to abstain from certain kinds of actions. 
Most of the rules that regulate our lives, in the realm of politics no less 
than in the realm of our personal conduct, are, in fact, negative rules, rules that 
exclude specified courses of action as not permissible (“You shall not…”) but 
leave scope for discretionary choice within the remaining range of options. In 
this sense – and only in this sense – rule-following and prudential, discretionary 
choice are not mutually exclusive alternatives but may coexist. 
Given how I defined before the contrast between rule-following and 
discretionary choice, an obvious question is, of course, why anyone may want 
to be bound by rules rather than being allowed to do in each and every choice 
situation what promises the best consequences, all things considered. The 
principal question that needs to be answered is: what can be the “reason of 
rules,” what arguments can be made in favour of rule-based as opposed to 
discretionary politics? 
Before looking specifically at the reason of rules in politics I shall first 
consider the reason of rules in our personal conduct. 
That there can be a reason for rule following at all is due to the fact that 
there are certain types of problems that we face recurrently as we go about our 
ordinary day-to-day business. Even if in an ever-changing world every choice 
situation we face is in a sense unique, certain kinds of problems we have to deal 
with repeatedly such as, for instance, how to organize our workday, how to deal 
with our family members, with friends or business partners, how to operate our 
car in traffic ... and numerous other kinds of problems that we confront again 
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and again. For such kinds of recurrent problems experience can accumulate 
over time for how they can – in general – be dealt with successfully, even if in 
certain respects each of them will be unique. 
The most general argument for rules is that by relying on time-tested 
general recipes or rules for how to behave in such recurrent problem situations 
we may be able to do overall better than if we were to try to pick in a 
discretionary manner what appears to us to be the best option given the specifics 
in each particular case. 
We can, however, specify three reasons in particular for why rule-
following may be superior to discretionary choice, three reasons that I will 
consecutively discuss under the headings knowledge problem, incentive 
problem, and reputation problem. 
The knowledge problem has been most explicitly stressed by Friedrich 
Hayek. It plays, in fact, a most central role in his social and economic 
philosophy. In various versions and at several places of his work he has 
emphasized that “the reliance on rules is a device we have learned to use 
because our reason is insufficient to master the full detail of complex reality”9. 
As Hayek points out, that there are advantages to following rules may seem 
paradoxical if one considers the fact that rules typically instruct us to focus on 
particular aspects of a choice situation we are facing and ignore other aspects 
that we may know about. The rule to keep promises, for instance, tells us that, if 
we have given a promise, we should keep it irrespective of other considerations 
that may induce us to prefer breaking it. Or, to use another example, the rule to 
stop at a red traffic light and to go on green at an intersection tells us to focus on 
the colour of the traffic light and ignore other aspects of the particular instance. 
In other words, rules are “selective” in what they instruct us to pay attention to, 
and such selectivity raises the obvious question how it can be advantageous at 
all to ignore in one’s choices circumstances one in fact can know about. 
The answer to this question is to be found in the comparison between the 
selectivity of rules and the unavoidable selectivity of the choices we make when 
we try to consider all things. As Hayek argues, in face of the “inexhaustible 
complexity of everything” it is impossible for us to actually consider “all 
things” and to correctly anticipate all the direct and indirect effects of our 
actions. In our discretionary choice we will inevitably respond selectively to 
certain aspects of the situation and our selectivity may well lead us to ignore 
what would be crucial if we were in fact able to consider all things. 
As noted, rules are selective as well. By contrast to the incidental 
selectivity of our deliberate choices, though, rules are “purposefully” selective. 
Their advantage lies in the fact that they not only facilitate our choices by 
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allowing us to focus our attention on selected aspects of the choice situation but 
also promise to select those aspects that in fact help us to make better choices 
than would otherwise be the case. 
For the purpose of illustration consider the above mentioned simple 
example, the recurrent problem of crossing an intersection:  
– Discretionary choice would mean, to do always what is best, all 
things considered. 
– Rule following would mean, to stop on red and to go on green, in other 
words, it means to focus one’s attention on the colour of the traffic light 
and to treat other aspects of the situation that one may be able to 
observe as irrelevant for the choice one has to make. 
To be sure, with discretionary choice, making use of all the information 
that we obtain in the situation, we may, theoretically, be able to make “better” 
choices than just complying with the colour of the traffic light. Yet, in our 
attempt to do what, all things considered, seems best to us, we may well make 
mistakes, overlooking a policeman and being fined a ticket for running a red light, 
or having misjudged the speed of an approaching car and getting into an accident. 
On the other hand, with rule following we may also make “mistakes” in a 
sense, unnecessarily waiting at a red light when we could safely cross or getting 
nevertheless, despite our own rule-compliance, involved in an accident because 
some other driver ignores his red light.  
The point of this example is that neither our discretionary choice nor the 
rules that we may follow are “perfect” in the sense of guaranteeing us always 
what would be best, all things considered, in every single instance. Yet, for us 
as unavoidably imperfect human beings what would be best to do if we knew 
everything is not the relevant standard of judgment. The relevant comparison is 
between the overall pattern of outcomes that is likely to result under 
discretionary choice on the one side and under rule following on the other. And 
good rules, especially time-tested rules that incorporate the experiences 
accumulated over generations, may provide in this regard much better guidance 
than our discretionary choices.  
The second reason of rules, that I want to point out, comes, as I said 
before, under the heading “incentive problem”. Even though it is somewhat 
related to the knowledge problem it is useful to consider the incentive problem 
in discretionary choice as a separate issue. 
As human experience tells us, and psychological research confirms, in 
discretionary choice we are tempted to give undue consideration to current 
needs and short-term effects of our actions at the expense of their long-term 
consequences. We eat good-tasting, but unhealthy food stuff even though we 
know of its longer-term harmful effects. We postpone unpleasant but necessary 
tasks even though we know that we will regret it later, and so on. The very 
rationale of many of the traditional rules of conduct that are passed on from 
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generation to generation is to remedy this deficiency in our motivational make-
up. They instruct us to behave in ways that require us to curb our current desires 
in favour of superior benefits to be reaped in the longer run. 
I may mention here that, when James Buchanan was awarded in 1986 the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Science we decided at the Center for Study of Public 
Choice, where I spent the years from 1983 to 1995 to found the journal 
Constitutional Political Economy. As those of you who have seen the journal 
know, for the cover page we chose the image of Ulysses bound to the mast of 
his ship as a symbol for the rule-oriented focus of constitutional economics, a 
symbol that was meant to convey that to be bound by rules may allow us to reap 
benefits that otherwise we could not obtain, just as Ulysses needed to be bound 
to be able to enjoy the songs of the Sirens and not to perish. 
The third reason of rules that I subsume under the heading “reputation 
problem” has to do with the effects of our own choices affect how other people 
perceive us and what that means in turn for our prospects of achieving our 
goals. Consider, for example, the problem of whether one should always keep 
one’s promises as opposed to deciding in each particular case in light of the 
specific circumstances whether one should do so or not. 
It is certainly true that the discretionary opportunist who decides each 
case as he sees fit will be able to capture opportunities to default on promises 
with impunity, opportunities that a principled person will miss. But it is also 
true that the person who earns a reputation for always keeping her promises will 
be a much more attractive partner in business dealings and in other matters than 
the discretionary opportunist. And, being a more attractive partner for cooperative 
endeavours means that he or she will have opportunities for mutually beneficial 
deals that the opportunist will be excluded from. 
In general it can be said that by following rules one can earn a reputation 
as an honest and reliable person, a reputation that constitutes a kind of social 
capital from which many benefits in our dealing with others can be reaped. 
In the concluding part of my talk I want to discuss how the same three 
reasons of rules apply at the level of politics no less than to our personal conduct. 
As an exemplification of the knowledge problem in politics consider the 
issue of industrial policy, an issue that has since long marked a division 
between French political attitudes and German Ordnungspolitik – even if, as I 
should repeat, German governments too were not always consistent in following 
the precepts of Ordnungspolitik. 
If governments were perfect in identifying winners and in properly 
assessing the overall balance of desirable and undesirable consequences of 
granting tax-privileges or direct subsidies to particular firms or industries, 
citizens might wish to grant their governments the authority to engage in such 
policies. But if governments are not perfect predictors of future economic 
development and are susceptible to lobbying by special-interest groups citizens 
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have reasons to fear that such discretionary authority may be misused and mal-
applied. In the face of such risks citizens’ interests will be much better served 
by denying government the authority for such discretionary interventions and 
limiting its authority to conducting economic policy by general rules of the 
game that provide a suitable framework for economic activity. 
In speaking about the lobbying of interest groups I have already implicitly 
drawn a connection between the knowledge problem and the incentive problem 
that constitutes the second reason of rules. If government is given the authority 
to decide in a discretionary manner which industries to support, which firms to 
save from bankruptcy, or which banks to bail out, they face not only a 
knowledge problem but also the incentive problems that come from inviting 
rentseeking by special-interest groups. Re-election-seeking politicians will be 
easily tempted to seek the support of the groups that are favoured by their 
discretionary interventions, especially if the costs to the rest of the citizenry are 
widely dispersed and not obvious to the economically untrained eye. Even if 
politicians are aware of the long-term damage that such interventions cause, the 
competition for votes may well induce them to act counter to their better insights. 
Again, considering such risks citizens will be well advised to prefer a 
rule-governed politics over discretionary intervention even if, theoretically, 
there might well be cases in which government interventions could do some 
good, if they were taken in full consideration of all relevant facts and unaffected 
by interest-group lobbying – a qualification that is unlikely to be fulfilled in 
real-world politics. – This is exactly the problem that, as noted before, the 
founders of the Freiburg School addressed with their formula of the “strong 
state,” meaning a state that is constrained by constitutional rules that do not 
allow it to give in to interest-group demands for privileged treatment. 
Third and last there is the reputation effect of rule following in politics. 
This effect has found particular attention in the context of fiscal and monetary 
politics. Under the title “Rules Rather than Discretion” Kydland and Prescott 
published in 1977 a well-known article in which they argued that a discretionary 
policy which seeks to select the “best action, given the current situation” will 
fail to reach its objectives because in a dynamic economic system the economic 
players will adjust their expectations10. Because of how they affect expectations, 
so Kydland and Prescott argue, a policy of aggregate demand management, for 
instance, is likely to result “in excessive levels of inflation” without lowering 
unemployment. The general conclusion they draw from their analysis is “that 
policymakers should follow rules rather than have discretion... (and) that 
economic theory should be used (not to inquire into the effects of specific 
policy measures but) to evaluate alternative policy rules and the one with good 
                                                          
10
  Finn E. Kydland, Edward C. Prescott, “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans”, in Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1977, pp. 473-491.  
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characteristics should be selected.” – This corresponds exactly to the central 
message of the German Ordnungspolitik tradition. 
Kydland and Prescott add an important argument when they state: “In a 
democratic society it is probably preferable that selected rules are simple and 
easily understood, so it is obvious when a policymaker deviates from the policy.” 
It is worth noting that the American economist Henry Simons already in 
the 1930s argued for an approach to economic policy that comes close to the 
German conception of Ordnungspolitik, regrettably though without having a 
noticeable impact on the economics profession. In his paper “Rules versus 
Authorities in Monetary Policy,” originally published in 1936, Simons spoke 
about the “danger of substituting authorities for rules which especially deserves 
attention among students of money”, and he explicitly argued: “An enterprise system 
cannot function effectively in the face of extreme incertainty as to the action of 
monetary authorities... We must avoid a situation where every business decision 
becomes largely a speculation on the future of monetary policy”11. Without 
principles ruling over expediency, Simon concluded, “political control must 
degenerate into endless concessions to organized minorities, with gradual 
undermining of the ‘constitutional structure’ under which free-enterprise 
economy and representative government can function”.12  
In a recent paper in which he criticizes the bailing out of banks with 
taxpayers money, the monetary economist Lawrence White has noted: “If 
everyone knows that the rule of law will be followed, such that nobody will be 
bailed out, the incentive for imprudence disappears…, (at least) there won’t be 
system-wide mal-incentives producing an epidemic of imprudence”13.  
I want to conclude with a few brief remarks on an argument that is a 
standard response in times of crises, and that is popular in the current crisis as 
well, namely that, as the German saying goes, “Not kennt kein Gebot”, meaning 
that in emergency situations one cannot be bound by rules. To this argument 
two comments are appropriate. 
Firstly, prudence does indeed require us to acknowledge that there may be 
emergency situations in which we need to temporarily disband rules that in 
ordinary times we consider binding. But, if we do not want discretionary 
expediency to be allowed in by the back door, we need to adopt rules for when 
and by whom and according to what procedures an emergency can be declared 
as well as rules that constrain what the authority in charge is allowed to do in 
such emergency situations. 
                                                          
11
  Henry C. Simons 1948 (1936), p. 161. Reprinted in Henry C. Simons, “Rules versus Authorities in 
Monetary Policy,” in Economic Policy for a Free Society, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1948, pp. 160-183.  
12
  Henry C. Simons 1948 (1936), p. 170. 
13
  Lawrence White, “The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?”, in Cato Journal, 30, 
2010, pp. 451-463.  
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Secondly and more importantly, crises as the one we are currently faced 
with in Europe do not come upon us like natural disasters. They are typically 
the cumulative outcome of a continued violation of rules that, if they would 
have been followed, would not have allowed the crisis to come about in the first 
place. I think I do not need to enumerate the rules, such as the deficit ceilings 
and the no-bail-out clause in the Maastricht treaty, that have been systematically 
disregarded repeatedly, paving the way for the current sovereign-debt crisis. 
Admittedly, it was the German government under chancellor Schröder 
which in 2004 set an unfortunate precedent in seeking an exemption from the 
Maastricht deficit criteria. All the more it is to be hoped that Germany’s current 
insistence on binding rules may serve as a reminder that submitting to prudent 
rules is the only reliable protection against sliding into crises of the kind we are 
presently trying to escape from. 
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